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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In response to Mr. Mendiola's assertions on appeal in support of his claim that
the district court erred when it dismissed his post-conviction petition, the State has
claimed that: (1) one of Mr. Mendiola's claims was not properly justiciable in postconviction proceedings because it could have been raised on direct appeal; (2)
Mr. Mendiola failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea
was coerced; and (3) Mr. Mendiola failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence his post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This Reply
Brief is necessary to address the State's contentions.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mendiola's petition for post-conviction relief
in light of the numerous erroneous factual findings and legal errors that, cumulatively
and individually, demonstrate that the district court failed to properly adjudicate
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mendiola's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief In Liqht Of The Numerous Erroneous Factual Findinns And Leqal Errors That,
Cumulativelv And Individually, Demonstrate That The District Court Failed To Properly
Adiudicate Mr. Mendiola's Post-Conviction Claims
A.

Mr. Mendiola's Assertion That The District Court Erred When It Failed To
Ascertain Whether There Was A Stronq Factual Basis To Support His Alford Plea
Of Guilty Was Properlv Presented In His Post-Conviction Petition
The State has suggested on appeal that Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims

regarding the failure of the district court to ascertain a factual basis in support of his
~ l f o r d 'plea were procedurally barred and, therefore, the district court did not err in
dismissing Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition with regard to this issue
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9.) This argument is made in reliance upon I.C. § 19-4901(b),
which provides in pertinent part that any issue that could have been raised in direct
appeal, but was not, is generally forfeited in post-conviction. I.C. § 19-4901(b) (see also
Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9.) While acknowledging the case law that has repeatedly
found that a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea is cognizable in post-conviction, the
State nevertheless urges this Court to find that, in Mr. Mendiola's case, a different set of
rules should apply.
What is not acknowledged in the Respondent's Brief is clear and dispositive
language from the case law cited by the State that governs exactly the type of challenge
that Mr. Mendiola raised in his post-conviction petition with regard to the validity of his
Alford plea. A defendant may raise a challenge to the validity of his or her guilty plea for
the first time in a petition for post-conviction relief because these claims are a request,

' See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

"to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction of the
court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could have been raised
on appeal." Ricca v. Sfafe, 124 ldaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App.1993)
(quoting Maxfield v. State, 108 ldaho 493, 499, 700 P.2d 115, 121 (Ct. App. 1985))
(emphasis added). As further noted by the ldaho Court of Appeals in Nellsch v. Sfafe, a
defendant's failure to appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence based upon
alleged deficiencies in the taking of his or her plea, "does not bar these claims from
being heard on a petition for post-conviction relief." Nellsch v. Sfafe, 122 ldaho 426,
430, 835 P.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1992).
The sum and substance of the State's procedural argument is that
Mr. Mendiola's claims regarding the failure to establish a factual basis for his plea could
have been raised through a direct appeal, and therefore his case is distinguishable from
the numerous cases that have deemed such a claim to be cognizable in post-conviction.
However, the very cases relied upon by the State expressly provide that such claims
are cognizable even if the assertion could have been raised on appeal. Given this, the
State's contention is without support in law.
Further, the district court elaborated on additional reasons, beyond the fact that
case law established the justiciability of Mr. Mendiola's claims, for granting an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether a factual basis was established for
Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. First, the district court noted that, if I.C. § 19-4901 was
interpreted in the way advocated by the State, both before the district court and now on
appeal, many claims (such as ineffective assistance of counsel) would not be
reviewable at all through post conviction, and that this was clearly not what was

intended by the legislature. (R., pp.151-152.) Moreover, the district court found that it
was possible that Mr. Mendiola could be better able to develop his claims in postconviction through presentation of his trial counsel's testimony or other evidence.
(R., p.152.)

Finally, the district court determined that an evidentiary hearing was

appropriate on this issue in light of concerns for judicial economy and prevention of
collateral proceedings with regard to this issue. (R., pp.152-153.)
It is also worth noting that the State has asserted in a parenthetical that the ldaho
Court of Appeals in Simons v. State suggested that a claim in post-conviction regarding
the lack of a factual basis in support of a plea "might have been barred by I.C. § 194901(b)." (Respondent's Brief, p.8 n.2.) However, upon review of the portion of the
opinion from which the State cites this language, it is apparent that the Simons Court
was referring to a different issue than the question of whether the district court erred
when it failed to establish the factual basis for the defendant's plea. See Simons v.
State, 116 ldaho 69, 71, 773 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Ct. App. 1989).
The defendant in Simons raised three issues for appellate review regarding her
post-conviction petition: (1) whether she was charged under the wrong statute and
should have been charged with vehicular manslaughter rather than voluntary
manslaughter; (2) whether her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter was supported by
an adequate factual basis; and (3) whether her sentence was excessive and should
have been reduced. Simons, 116 ldaho at 70-71, 773 P.2d at 1157-1158. And the
Simons Court addressed each of these issues in the order presented. The portion of
the Simons Opinion cited to by the State was specific to the first issue - whether the
defendant in Simons should have been charged with vehicular manslaughter rather than

voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 71, 773 P.2d at 1158. But there is no such language, or
indication of a similar concern, regarding the claim in Simons that the district court erred
in failing to ascertain the factual basis for the defendant's plea. Id. at 76, 773 P.2d at
1I63.2
Finally, the State's assertion that Mr. Mendiola's claim regarding the district
court's failure to establish a factual basis for his Alford plea was entirely dependant on
matters contained within the underlying criminal proceedings is inaccurate, as the State
ignores the testimony that was presented by Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel, John Adams,
in support of this claim. (Tr., p.36, L.22 - p.37, L.9.) The State, in seeking summary
disposition on this claim, asserted that "Petitioner's counsel stipulated that the transcript
of the grand jury proceeding established probable cause for the charge to which the
petitioner was pleading guilty," and then extrapolated this stipulation to extend to the
factual basis for the plea itself. (R., p.124.) It was only through the evidentiary hearing
held regarding Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition that Mr. Mendiola was able to
expand the record so that his attorney could clarify, through his testimony, that the
stipulation made at Mr. Mendiola's change-of-plea hearing was much more limited than
the State claimed. When asked specifically whether he had stipulated to the factual
basis for the plea, Mr. Adams responded:

This Court may also wish to note that, as one of the reasons provided in support of
entertaining the merits of the defendant's claim regarding being charged under the
wrong statute, the Simons Court cited favorably to considerations that the district court
was motivated to entertain the claim out of concerns of administrative efficiency and
avoidance of collateral proceedings. Simons, 116 Idaho at 71, 773 P.2d at 1158.
These grounds are very similar to those cited to by the district court in favor of granting
an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition. (R., pp.151-153.)

That's incorrect. I stipulated that the grand jury transcript provided
probable cause for the filing of an Amended Information or an Amended
Indictment. I never stipulated to a factual basis.
Tr., p.37, Ls.6-9.)
To the extent that the parties disputed whether trial counsel at the change of plea
hearing had actually conceded that the grand jury transcript formed the factual basis for
Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea, the testimony provided by Mr. Adams, which was only made
in accordance with the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition,
provided material evidence on this issue outside of the record in the underlying criminal
proceedings that could not have been presented on direct appeal. In light of this, the
State's claim that Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition did not present new or
additional evidence regarding his challenge to the validity of his Alford plea is belied by
the record of the proceedings in this case. (See Respondent's Brief, p.6.)
The State has further asserted, albeit within a footnote in its Respondent's Brief,
that, should this Court entertain the merits of Mr. Mendiola's claims regarding the district
court's failure to ascertain a factual basis in support of his Alford plea, "Mendiola has
failed to show error by the district court." (Respondent's Brief, p.5 n.1.) However, the
State provides no analysis or authority in support of this blanket assertion.

The

Respondent's contentions on appeal must be supported with the reasons in support of
the contentions and citation to "the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and
record relied upon" in order to be properly presented on appeal. See I.A.R. 35(b)(6);
see also State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). The State has
failed to provide any argument or authority to support its claim.

B.

Mr. Mendiola May Challenae, On Direct Appeal. Whether The District Court's
Credibilitv Determinations Were Supported Bv Substantial And Comeetent
Evidence. As The District Court's Credibilitv Determinations Are Factual Findinas
That Are Material To The Underlying Adiudication Of The Legal Merits Of
Mr. Mendiola's Case And Are Reviewable By This Court For Whether These
Findings Were Clearlv Erroneous
Mr. Mendiola has also challenged some of the district court's credibility

determinations as being clearly erroneous in light of the absence of any evidence to
support these .factual findings. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) The State's sole response
to this claim is contained within a footnote, in which the State characterizes
Mr. Mendiola's argument as "specious," and cites to two cases, but does not set forth
any analysis specific to the substance of Mr. Mendiola's claims. (Respondent's Brief,
p.13 n.3.)
As has been noted, the State's arguments on appeal must be supported with the
reasons in support of the contentions and citation to "the authorities, statutes and parts
of the transcript and record relied upon" in order to be properly presented on appeal.
See I.A.R. 35(b)(6); see also State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996). While the State has cited to case law in its footnote, the State has not provided
any argumentation or analysis as to how it is that these cases are pertinent to this
Court's resolution of the issues on appeal or how these cases would support the bald
claim that Mr. Mendiola's arguments are "specious." (Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.3.)
In addition, the State's reliance on State v. Perry is misplaced, as this case only
stands for the proposition that determinations of credibility are to be made by the initial
fact-finder in a criminal case, and that an appellate court cannot conduct its own de
novo reweighing of credibility. See State v. Perry, 139 ldaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230,
1235 (2003). In other words, a party on appeal may not request that an appellate court

make its own credibility determinations as a substitute for the determinations already
made by the jury.3
However, this does not mean that credibility determinations made by the district
court as part of its fact-finding process in adjudicating a post-conviction petition are
entirely insulated from any appellate review. In a civil proceeding that is tried to the
district court, where the district court makes an express finding of credibility and then
applies that factual finding to its legal conclusions, this constitutes a factual finding that
is reviewable on appeal for whether the determination is clearly erroneous. Stuart v.
State, 127 ldaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); see also Electrical Wholesale
Supply Co. Inc. v. Neilson, 136 ldaho 814, 41 P.3d 242, 250 (2001) (appellate court
generally does not second-guess the trial court's credibility determinations "unless they
are unsupported by the evidence in the record," and reviewing the district court's
credibility determination for whether it was supported by substantial and competent
evidence); I.R.C.P. 52(a).

While this Court gives deference to such credibility

determinations, these findings are not exempt from appellate review and may be
disregarded when the credibility determination is not supported by the evidence in the
record. Id.
Mr. Mendiola has challenged the district court's credibility determinations, which
were relied on throughout the district court's legal conclusions in this case, as being
without support in the evidence. He has not requested that this Court itself make new

The other case cited by the State, Mitchell v. State, is relied upon merely for the
premise that factual findings are reviewed for whether the finding is clearly erroneous.
Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998); (see also
Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.3). This is identical to the standard articulated and argued in
Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21, 24-28.)

credibility determinations to supplant those of the district court, but merely seeks review
of whether the credibility determinations made by the district court were supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Pertinent case law establishes that this is a
proper challenge to the district court's underlying findings regarding credibility, and the
State has presented this Court with no reasoned analysis to refute Mr. Mendiola's
claims.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Relief On
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Guilty Plea Was lnvoluntarv In Light Of The
State's Threats To Prosecute Mr. Mendiola's Sisters And Seek Greater Charaes
Aaainst Mr. Mendiola's Brothers Unless He Pleaded Guilty
In response to Mr. Mendiola's assertion that his guilty plea was involuntary, as it

was predicated entirely on the State's threat to prosecute his sisters, brothers, and
brother-in-law, the State focuses its entire argument on only one factor of the overall
considerations regarding whether the package plea deal was proper: whether the
threatened prosecution of Mr. Mendiola's family members was brought in good faith.
However, the analysis of whether a plea was entered voluntarily does not rest on any
one factor and there are additional standards that govern the entry of such pleas that
were not met in Mr. Mendiola's case. Additionally, the State's arguments regarding
whether the State could have presented charges in good faith against Mr. Mendiola's
sisters are erroneous.
From the State's analysis, it would appear that the State believes that the
existence of bad faith of the prosecution is an essential element of Mr. Mendiola's claim
that his guilty plea was coerced due to the fact that it was the product of the State's
threat to prosecute all of Mr. Mendiola's brothers and sisters if he did not so plead.

(Respondent's Brief, p.13.) It is not an element. Whether there was a good faith basis
to support the charges threatened against third parties is merely one factor that has
bearing on the overall determination of the voluntariness of a package plea agreement.

In re lbarra, 666 P.2d 980, 986-987 (Cal. 1983) (overruled on other grounds by
People v. Mosby, 92 P.3d 841 (Cal. 2004)). The analysis of whether a package plea
agreement resulted in a guilty plea that was coerced and therefore not voluntary is not
subject to bright-line rules, but rather turns on the specific facts and circumstances of a
particular case. State

v. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho 530, 537, 21 1 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App.

2008); Mafa v. Stafe, 124 ldaho 588, 594, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ct. App. 1993); Ibarra,
666 P.2d at 986.
In particular, the proper enquiry is whether "an innocent person would have felt
compelled to plead guilty" in light of the circumstances that induced the plea. Id. As
has previously been argued in Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief, he has met this
standard by a preponderance of the evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-34, 36-38.) Of
particular note is the fact that the State's threatened prosecution in this case was not
merely of one member of Mr. Mendiola's immediate family, but of an entire generation
of his immediate family - both of his brothers, both of his sisters, and his former brotherin-law. (R., p.60 at Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.7, L.20.) This fact alone separates Mr. Mendiola's
case from those cases in ldaho that have found package plea agreements to be noncoercive. Given the depth and breadth of the outside force that was brought to bear on
Mr. Mendiola, he has established by a preponderance of the evidence under the record
in this case that in light of these circumstances, an innocent person likely would have
felt compelled to plead guilty.

What is further especially troubling, and would on its own justify permitting
Mr. Mendiola to withdraw his plea, is the fact that the district court failed to take any
special care in exploring the potential coercive impact of the threatened prosecutions on

Mr. Mendiola's decision to plead guilty, despite being aware of the package plea
agreement. A central requirement with regard to package plea agreements, given the
"inherent dangers related to such third-party negotiations," is that the district court at the
change-of-plea hearing use special care and employ close scrutiny to the details of
such agreements and the potential coercive impact upon the defendant. See Mata v.
State, 124 ldaho 588, 594-595, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259-1260 (Ct. App. 1993); see also
State

V.

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 540, 211 P.3d 775, 785 (Ct. App. 2008) (J.

Schwartzman, concurring).
The coercive forces that may be at work in package plea agreement cases
require unique care because such cases often bring into play pressures upon a
defendant which are not related to the case, such as the desire to spare a family
member from threatened prosecution or otherwise secure to another more lenient
treatment. See Ibarra, 666 P.2d at 986. "The voluntariness of a plea bargain which
contemplates special concessions to another

- especially a sibling or

a loved one

-

bears particular scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court conscious of the psychological
pressures upon an accused such a situation creates." Id. at 987. As has been noted in
the Appellant's Brief, and is undisputed by the State on appeal, this requisite searching
enquiry never occurred. (Appellant's Brief, pp.30-32, 36-37.)
The good faith of the threatened prosecution of family members or other third
persons is certainly a condition precedent to a finding that a package plea deal is not

coercive. See U.S.

V.

Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5ithCir. 1979). This is because, in

absence of probable cause to believe that the third party has committed a crime,
offering to forego prosecution of that person as a concession to the defendant
"constitutes a species of fraud." Id. As such, a guilty plea that is induced by the
promise not to charge a third party, where there is no good faith basis to bring such a
charge, invalidates a guilty plea outright. Id.
In this case, Mr. Mendiola did dispute the good faith basis for the threatened
charges against Mr. Mendiola's sisters. With regard to the State's argument that the
threatened prosecutions of Mr. Mendiola's brothers were made in good faith,
Mr. Mendiola noted that no indictments were ever obtained against his sisters, who
were part of the package plea deal in Mr. Mendiola's case. (R., pp.122, 132, 134, 173174, 176.)
The State, in turn, made no effort before the district court to refute Mr. Mendiola's
assertions that the threatened prosecution of his sisters was not made in good faith the State's sole argument was that there was probable cause to support charges
against his brothers and brother-in-law. (R., p.122.) This Court may also wish to note
that, in order for there to have been any good faith. basis to charge Mr. Mendiola's
sisters as accessories after the fact of his alleged offense, the State would have to have
a basis to establish that his sisters knew that a felony had been committed and either
willfully concealed information from the police or harbored and protected their brother
from the law. See I.C. § 18-205. By the district court's own findings, the only evidence
relating to Mr. Mendiola's sisters was that the alleged victim's car was driven to their
residence and Mr. Mendiola stayed with his sisters briefly following his alleged crime.

(R., pp.268-269.) Nothing in this evidence supports any probable cause to believe that
Mr. Mendiola's sisters had any pertinent knowledge of the offense he was alleged to
have committed, nor that they willfully concealed any information or intended to harbor
their brother from the police.
Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Mr. Mendiola has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was coerced - i.e.
that an innocent person would have felt compelled to plead guilty in like circumstances

- and therefore his plea was invalid.
D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Relief On
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Attornev Was ineffective For Failins To
Challenge The Lack Of A Sufficient Factual Basis To Support Mr. Mendiola's
Alford Plea
In response to Mr. Mendiola's assertion that the district court erred in denying

Mr. Mendiola post-conviction relief based upon his assertion that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of a factual basis to support his Alford plea,
the State asserts that the grand jury transcript, which was not reviewed by the district
court at the time of accepting Mr. Mendiola's plea, provided the factual basis. In making
this claim, the State relies primarily on two cases to sustain its position:

State v.

Ramirez, 722 ldaho 830, 839 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1992) and Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho
1002, 712 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1985). (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-16.) However, a
review of these cases reveals that they do not, in fact, support the State's contentions
on appeal.
From the outset, the State repeatedly cites to one particular passage in Ramirez,
but apparently fails to give effect to the second portion of the passage cited.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.13, 15, 16.) The State quotes the following language from
Ramirez in support of its claim that the district court could rely on a grand jury transcript
that was not reviewed by the court at the time of taking an Alford plea of guilty to find a
factual basis in support of such a plea: "In determining whether a factual basis for a
guilty plea exists, we look to the entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea
was accepted." Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. The critical language in
this passage, however, is found in the last clause of the sentence. This Court looks to,
"the entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea was accepted." Id. By its
very terms, this limits review of the information in support of a guilty plea to that which is
actually considered by the district court at the time of taking the plea.
This point is made more clear by the very next sentences in the paragraph from
which the State has lifted the quoted language from Ramirez. The Ramirez Court
continues:
In this case the trial judge who accepted Ramirez's plea was not the same
judge who presided over the preliminary hearing, and there is no
indication that the trial judge obtained or reviewed a transcript of the
preliminary hearing.
However, based solely on the information
ascertained by the trial judge at the change of plea hearing, we conclude
that the judge did ascertain that there was a strong factual basis for the
plea, and that Ramirez did enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily.
Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. By its very terms, and as has previously
been noted in the Appellant's Brief, the Ramirez Opinion actually supports
Mr. Mendiola's argument that the factual basis in support of an Alford plea can only be
determined by that evidence that was ascertained by the district court as the basis in
support of the Alford plea at the time the plea was taken. (Appellant's Brief, pp.34-35.)

The second case primarily relied upon by the State, Fowler, likewise does not
provide support for the State's position and, in fact, support's Mr. Mendiola's
contentions in this case. From the outset, it does not appear from the case in Fowler
that the defendant entered an Alford plea to the underlying offense. Fowler, 109 ldaho
at 1003, 712 P.2d 704. This alone makes the holding in Fowler inapposite, as it is
generally only in the context of an Alford plea that the district court is required to
establish a factual basis for the plea at the time the plea is taken. See Rarnirez, 122
ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248; Odorn v. State, 121 ldaho 625, 627, 826 P.2d 1337,
1339 (Ct. App. 1992).
While the Fowler Court did look to information contained within the defendant's
presentence investigation report, generated after the defendant entered his guilty plea,
i o support the factual basis for the defendant's plea, the Fowler Court did so because it
was confronted with a different type of challenge than that raised by Mr. Mendiola. The
defendant in Fowler contended that "the statement in his presentence report concerning
his lack of intent to steal from the restaurant created a duty of the district court - at the
time of sentencing - to inquire into the factual basis for the plea." Fowler, 109 ldaho at
1005, 712 P.2d at 706 (emphasis added).
This challenge was rooted in a separate line of authority for when the duty to
establish a factual basis for a plea may be triggered: that being where, after a plea is
entered but before sentence is imposed, a trial court receives information raising an
obvious doubt as to whether the defendant is in fact guilty. Id. (quoting Schmidt v.
State, 103 ldaho 340, 345, 647 P.2d 796, 801 (Ct. App. 1982)). And the standards for
such a challenge mirror those for when the challenge is appropriately raised for the

failure to establish a factual basis at the time of taking a plea -the Fowler Court limited
its review of the record to only that information that was before the district court at the
time of sentencing. Id. Because the defendant in Fowler asserted that the information
contained in his presentence investigation report raised an obvious doubt as to his guilt
at fhe time o f sentencing, and because the district court had reviewed that information
at the time of sentencing, the Fowler Court included these materials in its review of
whether the district court had a sufficient factual basis to support the defendant's plea.
Id.

One further clarification is also necessary on this point. In its Respondent's Brief,
the State asserts, inter alia, that Mr. Mendiola has not argued that the grand jury
transcript fails to provide a factual basis for his Alford plea. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.)
In fact, Mr. Mendiola makes a lengthy challenge to the district court's finding that the
grand jury proceedings could be used to establish the factual basis for his guilty plea.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.21-24, 34-35.) Mr. Mendiola has asserted that the district court's
finding that it could use the grand jury transcripts to establish the factual basis for his
plea was erroneous because: (1) he had never stipulated that the grand jury transcript
provided a factual basis to support his plea, contrary to the finding of the district court;
and (2) this transcript was not actually reviewed by the district court at the time
Mr. Mendiola's plea was taken.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.21-24, 24-25.)

As such,

Mr. Mendiola has asserted that the district court erred when it used the grand jury
transcripts to establish the factual basis for his Alford plea.
Here, the district court admitted at the time Mr. Mendiola had entered his guilty
plea that it had never reviewed the contents of the grand jury transcripts at the time the

district court accepted Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. As such, this information was not
part of the factual basis that was actually ascertained by the district court at the time of
accepting Mr. Mendiola's plea. There is no other evidence or basis proffered in the
record in support of Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. Given this, Mr. Mendiola has
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to challenge the absence of a factual basis in support of his plea.

E.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Relief On
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failinct To
Present Critical Mitictating Evidence At Sentencinq
The State further asserts, with regard to Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claim that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain pieces of mitigating
evidence, that Mr. Mendiola, "never presented to the court the evidence he believed his
counsel deficiently failed to present." (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) The evidence claimed
to have been absent included the autopsy report and toxicology report performed on the
alleged victim, as well as evidence that indicated that the alleged victim was known to
carry a gun.
However, these very materials were presented to the district court in conjunction
with Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition. A post-conviction petition must present, or
be accompanied by, admissible evidence in support of the petitioner's claims. See
Sfafe v. Payne, 146 ldaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (emphasis added). The
evidence that may be presented in support of a post-conviction petition can include
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. I.C. 3 19-4907(a).
Mr. Mendiola acknowledges the ldaho Court of Appeals' holding in Loveland v.
Sfafe that not all pieces of documentary evidence tendered in support of a post-

conviction petition are automatically entered into evidence at an evidentiary hearing on
that petition. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751,754 (Ct. App. 2005).
However, the facts in Mr. Mendiola's case are materially distinguishable from those in
Loveland, and therefore, under the record in this case, the evidence at issue should be
deemed to have been incorporated into the evidence.
The defendant in Loveland had contended that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to abide by the defendant's request that counsel file a notice of appeal. Id. at
935, 120 P.3d at 753. Mr. Loveland initially provided an affidavit in support of his claims
in which he asserted that he had personally requested that his counsel file a notice of
appeal, but that counsel failed to do so. Id. At the evidentiary hearing, when asked if
the defendant would be presenting any evidence, the defendant indicated that he was
relying solely on the underlying criminal record and two transcripts of proceedings. Id.
The defendant then went a step further and disavowed any other evidence, stating,
"And I don't intend to rely upon any other facts other than what are in those transcripts,
Judge." Id. It was within this factual context that the Loveland Court concluded that the
defendant had declined to present any evidence in support of his post-conviction claims.
Id.

Here, Mr. Mendiola made no such disavowal, and both he and the State
incorporated the evidence presented in conjunction with Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction
petition into their arguments after the evidentiary hearing in this case. Mr. Mendiola
accompanied his post-conviction petition with admissible evidence that was attached to
his post-conviction petition and also incorporated those materials into his petition by
reference. (R., p.56.) These materials were further discussed during the testimony of

Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.19, L.12
p.32, L.20

- p.33, L.9.)

- p.20,

L.ll;

In addition, Mr. Mendiola also incorporated these materials into

his briefing and argument after the evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of whether
his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to present these pieces of
evidence to the district court at sentencing. (R., pp.180, 231.) This evidence was also
discussed by the State in its post-evidentiary hearing briefing. (R., p.215.) As such, it
was clear that the parties contemplated that the exhibits provided in support of
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition would be incorporated as evidence even after an
evidentiary hearing was granted.
Mr. Mendiola presented in his post-conviction petition, as evidence, the sworn
affidavit of Mr. Garcia. (R., pp.82-84.) Mr. Garcia was present at the day that Mr. Butler
was killed, and heard Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola arguing. (R., p.83.)

He further

averred that Mr. Mendiola had stated that Mr. Butler had pulled a gun, and that, "In the
past, I had seen Brendan [Butler] with a gun." (R., p.84.) Therefore, Mr. Mendiola did
present evidence to the district court in support of his post-conviction petition that
Mr. Butler was known to carry a gun in the past.
Mr. Mendiola also presented the autopsy report and the toxicology report
performed on Mr. Butler as evidence in support of his post-conviction claims.

(R., pp.85-95.) This autopsy report showed that Mr. Butler was on no less than three

-

opoids - hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and oxycodone and also under the influence
of marijuana at the time of his death. (R., p.85.) The toxicology report provides similar
findings. (R., p.95.) As such, the State's assertion that Mr. Mendiola never presented
this evidence to the district court is affirmatively refuted by the record.

Moreover, the district court's disregard of the information presented in
Mr. Garcia's affidavit tendered as evidence in support of Mr. Mendiola's petition for postconviction relief was based partly upon the district court's action that was clearly
improper - the district court taking judicial notice of its own memory of Mr. Garcia's
statements at his own sentencing hearing when no transcript of these statements was
ever produced. See Mafthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-808,839 P.2d 1215, 12211222 (1992).
As previously noted in Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief, trial counsel conceded
that it was deficient performance, and further was not a strategic decision, for counsel to
fail to present this evidence at sentencing. (Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20; p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.9)
(see also Appellant's Brief, pp.40-42.)

Further, Mr. Mendiola has established a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's admittedly deficient performance, the
district court would have struck a different balance at sentencing, as the district court at
sentencing was obviously quite concerned with the lack of evidence bearing on "the
extent of malice" that accompanied the alleged killing. (R., p.73 at Tr., at Tr., p.25, L.1 p.27, L.2; see also Appellant's Brief, pp.42-44.)
It is also worth noting that, at the time of sentencing, the district court was under
the erroneous belief that, "this wasn't a situation where someone under the influence of
drugs suddenly freaked out and that's why this ensued." (R., p.73 at Tr., p.26, Ls.1820.) Had the mitigating evidence of Mr. Garcia's statements regarding the sudden fight
between Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola been presented to the district court, along with the
autopsy and toxicology evidence showing that Mr. Butler had, in fact, been under the

influence of four separate controlled substances at the time, the district court would
have been made aware that this case quite likely presented just such a scenario.
In sum, Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition was accompanied by admissible
evidence in support of his claims regarding the failure of trial counsel to present
mitigating evidence at sentencing. This evidence was expressly incorporated into the
arguments of the parties following the evidentiary hearing in this case. The State's
contention to the contrary is erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Mendiola respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings
DATED this 1'' day of June, 2010.
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